Wednesday, 23 September 2015

thermodynamics - Why aren't (domestic) kettles insulated?


In my experience of buying and using kettles, I have come across none which are insulated.


The obvious reasons as to why it would be beneficial being that heating time would be reduced, similarly, less power hence money would be required to heat an arbitrary volume of water. Some kettles become very hot on the outside so safety is also a factor!


Is there a reason why this is so, apart from the costs involved? I.e. cost of manufacture vs. operating cost over the product lifetime.




Answer



Most kettles are silver to minimize heat loss through radiation. (They also have small exit holes at the top to minimize heat loss of steam because conversion of liquid water to steam requires latent heat)


I expect the reason that there is usually no thermal insulation is that kettles heat water very quickly and because the air outside the kettle is a poor conductor of heat the ammount of heat lost by conduction/convection is probably minimal compared to the ammount of enrgy that goes into the heating of the liquid to make it boil.


By contrast, a hot water tank in a central heating system stores hot water for long periods of time, so it makes sense to carefully insulate hot water tanks.


In summary, I think one way to think about this is that the air outside the kettle is good enough thermal insulation for the short time that the kettle boils the water.


terminology - What's a better phrase than "speed of light" for the universal spacetime speed constant?




The phrase "speed of light" is commonly used for the constant c =3E8 m/s, a feature that's "hardcoded" into the structure of spacetime. All massless waves and particles move at this speed, and it's a key concept in all fundamental theories in physics.


Light, in vacuum, is one fine example. But light in air or glass, or microwaves in a waveguide, move slower than c. The speed of actual light isn't the "speed of light". And of course there are plenty of other things besides electromagnetic quanta whose behavior is described by equations involving c.


The letter "c" alone isn't good for general writing and conversation, especially with non-scientists. It is fine as a mathematical symbol in equations, but isn't catchy or self-descriptive (albeit misleading) as "the speed of light".


EDIT: I have an impression I'm not asking this question in quite the right way. It's not at all about light, or phase or group velocities of light, but about our spacetime geometry having a fundamental constant speed "built in" - what to call it?


Historically it was discovered in connection with light, but c isn't specific to electromagnetism. It's important in all the fundamental forces, and in all situations with high energy particles flying about.


"Universal spacetime speed constant" would be an answer, but for that it's long and clumsy to repeat often in writings about physics. I'm looking for some name or phrase shorter and easier than that, but not so brief as just "c" which is okay in equations and tables of physical contants.




lagrangian formalism - Is the principle of least action fully equivalent to the Euler-Lagrange equations?


I am citing from Landau and Lifschitz, this statement that will seem to you well-known, trivial, etc:



"Between these positions, (i.e. $q_1$ and $q_2$) the system moves then in such a way that the integral $S = \int_{t_1}^{t_2} L(q, \dot q, t) dt \ $ have the smallest possible value."



My question: Are the Euler-Lagrange equations for this action functional, i.e. the differential laws of Lagrangian mechanics, fully equivalent to the integral statement of the principle of least action?


That the principle of least action implies that classical solutions fulfill the Euler-Lagrange equation is easy to see. But what about the converse implication - is every solution to the E-L equations a minimum of the action?



Can somebody show whether there is equivalence between the minimization of the integral and the differential equation, i.e. that the implication is in both directions?


I saw previous related questions and answers, but I am asking here a question of equivalence.




Tuesday, 22 September 2015

quantum mechanics - How do we know that we have captured the entire spectrum of the Harmonic Oscillator by using ladder operators?


Consider standard quantum harmonic oscillator, $H = \frac{1}{2m}P^2 + \frac{1}{2}m\omega^2Q^2$.


We can solve this problem by defining the ladder operators $a$ and $a^{\dagger}$. One can show that there is a unique "ground state" eigenvector $\psi_0$ with $H\psi_0 = \frac{1}{2}\hbar\omega\psi_0$ and furthermore that given any eigenvector $\psi$ of $H$ with eigenvalue $E$, the vector $a^{\dagger}\psi$ is also an eigenvector of $H$ with eigenvalue $E + \hbar\omega$.



However, it is usually stated that we now have all eigenvectors of $H$ by considering all vectors of the form $(a^{\dagger})^n\psi_0$.


How do we know that we have not missed any eigenvectors by this process? e.g. how do we know that eigenvalues are only of the form $E_n = (n+\frac{1}{2})\hbar\omega$?


Also a slightly more technical question, how do we know that the continuous spectrum of $H$ is empty?


The technical details I am operating with are that $\mathcal{H} = L^2(\mathbb{R})$ and all operators ($H, P, Q$) are defined on Schwartz space, so that they are essentially self-adjoint with their unique self-adjoint extensions corresponding to the actual observables.



Answer



It is sufficient to prove that the vectors $|n\rangle$ form a Hilbert basis of $L^2(\mathbb R)$. This fact cannot be completely established by using the ladder operators. To prove that the span of the afore-mentioned vectors is dense in the Hilbert space, one should write down the explicit expression of the wavefunctions of the said vectors recognizing that they are the well-known Hilbert basis of Hermite functions. Since the vectors $|n\rangle$ are a Hilbert basis, from standard results of spectral theory, the operator $$\sum_n \hbar \omega(n +1/2 ) |n\rangle \langle n | \tag{1}$$ (using the strong operator topology which defines the domain of this operator implicitly) is self-adjoint and its spectrum is a pure point spectrum made of the numbers $\hbar \omega(n +1/2 ) $ with $n$ natural. This fact proves that the initial symmetric Hamiltonian operator you described in your post and defined on the Schwartz space admits at least one self-adjoint extension with the said spectrum (in particular no continuous spectrum takes place). To prove that it is the unique self-adjoint extesion, i.e., that the initial symmetric operator is essentially self-adjoint, the shortest way is to observe that the vectors $|n\rangle$ are necessarily analytic vectors of the initial Hamiltonian (notice that all the afore-mentioned vectors stay in the Schwartz space which is the initial domain) because they are eigenvectors. Since they are a Hilbert basis, their span is dense. Under these hypotheses, a celebrated theorem by Nelson implies that the initial symmetric Hamiltonian operator is essentially self-adjoint and thus (1) is the only self-adjoint extension of the initial symmetric Hamiltonian operator. As a final comment, it is interesting to remark that (1) is not a differential operator differently from the naive initial Hamiltonian which is a differential operator but it is not self-adjoint.


quantum mechanics - Do black holes violate the uncertainty principle?


If black holes have mass but no size, does that imply zero uncertainty in position? If so, what does that imply for uncertainty in momentum?



Answer



General relativity is a classical theory. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle does not apply to it.


The research frontier in physics now exists in quantizing gravity and unifying it with the other three forces (strong , weak, electromagnetic). Once that is done the solution for the black hole will become a probability distribution and the Heisenberg principle will apply. The macroscopic classical solution of a point singularity will become a quantum mechanical uncertainty locus which will not change the macroscopic description. h_bar is a very small number and is already easily satisfied by the classical mechanics solutions all our constructions and engineering depend on.


rocket science - Escape velocity and orbital velocity confusion


If orbital velocity is reduced when we want to put a satellite in a higher orbit, and if to achieve a lower orbit we need to increase it's velocity, then how come by increasing the speed of the satellite we can escape the same satellite from earths gravity?




quantum mechanics - Can Bell's inequality violation be explained by the will of the scientist somehow affecting the experiment?


As far as I know, there are three possible ways to explain violation of Bell's inequality: violation of realism, violation of locality and violation of freedom. The first two are pretty straightforward even if weird, and well discussed. Violation of freedom is mentioned less often, usually in context of superdeterminism.


But as far as I understand it, violation of "freedom" only means that the results of experiments are not independent from the will of the scientist doing the experiment. What I don't get is that why is it follows that the scientist must have no free will then, assuming we want to keep both realism and locality. If the results of experiments aren't independent from the will, that only means they depend on each other somehow. Can't it be explained not by the absence of free will, but the other way around: that the will of the scientist in some really weird occult way affects the result of experiment? I realize that it sounds like a total nonsense, but then again so does every other explanation of the Bell's inequality violation. What I'm trying to understand here is whether superdeterminism is really the only possible (not the only reasonable) choice left when we exclude violations of realism and locality.


So the question is, if we assume that the mind of the scientist measuring the spin of an electron somehow affects the result of the measurement, would that explain Bell's inequality violation without the need for either nonlocality, nonrealism or superdeterminism?



Or, in even more general case, without introducing any kind of occult mystics: to explain Bell's inequality violation while still keeping some sort of hidden local variable theory, is it not enough to introduce some kind of dependence between the choice of a particular axis to measure the spin along and the result of the measurement? It is called hidden variable after all, so it could be changing depending on something.



Answer



I don't think this really makes sense. Here's an analogy I wrote up once to illustrate one of the simplest Bell inequalities:



Suppose we have a machine that generates pairs of scratch lotto cards, each of which has three boxes that, when scratched, can reveal either a cherry or a lemon. We give one card to Alice and one to Bob, and each scratches only one of the three boxes. When we repeat this many times, we find that whenever they both pick the same box to scratch, they always get the same result--if Bob scratches box A and finds a cherry, and Alice scratches box A on her card, she's guaranteed to find a cherry too.


Classically, we might explain this by supposing that there is definitely either a cherry or a lemon in each box, even though we don't reveal it until we scratch it, and that the machine prints pairs of cards in such a way that the "hidden" fruit in a given box of one card always matches the hidden fruit in the same box of the other card. If we represent cherries as + and lemons as -, so that a B+ card would represent one where box B's hidden fruit is a cherry, then the classical assumption is that each card's +'s and -'s are the same as the other--if the first card was created with hidden fruits A+,B+,C-, then the other card must also have been created with the hidden fruits A+,B+,C-.


The problem is that if this were true, it would force you to the conclusion that if Alice and Bob are picking randomly which box to scratch on each trial (with a 1/3 chance of A, B, or C each time), then if they do this a large number of times, we should expect that in the subset of trials where Alice and Bob happened to pick different boxes to scratch, they should find the same fruit at least 1/3 of the time. For example, if we imagine Bob and Alice's cards each have the hidden fruits A+,B-,C+, then we can look at each possible way that Alice and Bob can randomly choose different boxes to scratch, and what the results would be:


Bob picks A, Alice picks B: opposite results (Bob gets a cherry, Alice gets a lemon)


Bob picks A, Alice picks C: same results (Bob gets a cherry, Alice gets a cherry)


Bob picks B, Alice picks A: opposite (Bob gets a lemon, Alice gets a cherry)



Bob picks B, Alice picks C: opposite results (Bob gets a lemon, Alice gets a cherry)


Bob picks C, Alice picks A: same results (Bob gets a cherry, Alice gets a cherry)


Bob picks C, Alice picks picks B: opposite results (Bob gets a cherry, Alice gets a lemon)


In this case, you can see that that if they are equally likely to pick each combination of boxes, then 2 times out of 6 when they choose different boxes, they will get the same fruit (i.e. a 1/3 chance of the same result). You'd get the same answer if you assumed any other preexisting state where there are two fruits of one type and one of the other, like A+,B+,C- or A+,B-,C-. On the other hand, if you assume a state where each card has the same fruit behind all three boxes, so either they're both getting A+,B+,C+ or they're both getting A-,B-,C-, then of course even if Alice and Bob pick different boxes to scratch they're guaranteed to get the same fruits with probability 1. So if you imagine that when multiple pairs of cards are generated by the machine, some fraction of pairs are created in inhomogoneous preexisting states like A+,B-,C- while other pairs are created in homogoneous preexisting states like A+,B+,C+, then the probability of getting the same fruits when you scratch different boxes should be somewhere between 1/3 and 1. 1/3 is the lower bound, though--even if 100% of all the pairs were created in inhomogoneous preexisting states, it wouldn't make sense for you to get the same answers in less than 1/3 of trials where you scratch different boxes, provided you assume that each card has such a preexisting state with "hidden fruits" in each box.


But now suppose Alice and Bob look at all the trials where they picked different boxes, and found that they only got the same fruits 1/4 of the time! That would be the violation of Bell's inequality, and something equivalent actually can happen when you measure the spin of entangled photons along one of three different possible axes. So in this example, it seems we can't resolve the mystery by just assuming the machine creates two cards with definite "hidden fruits" behind each box, such that the two cards always have the same fruits in a given box.


Something mathematically analogous is predicted in certain experiments where entangled photons are passed through polarizers at different angles, in which the probability that both photons will have the same result (both pass through their respective polarizers, or both are blocked) is $ cos^2 (\theta) $, where $ \theta $ is the angle between the two polarizers. Suppose the experimenters decide in advance that on each trial, they will choose randomly between one of three angles for their polarizer: 0 degrees from vertical, 60 degrees, or 120 degrees. On a given trial, if both experimenters choose the same angle, then $ \theta = 0 $ so they are guaranteed to get the same result with probability 1 (both photons pass or both are blocked), but if they choose different settings the probability of getting the same result would be $ cos^2 (\pm 60) $ or $ cos^2 (\pm 120) $, which in both cases gives a probability of 1/4. But the Bell inequality whose derivation I sketched says that if you want to explain the perfect match when both experimenters make the same choice using local hidden variables, the probability of a match when they make different choices should be no lower than 1/3.



In terms of this analogy, here's how "violation of locality" or "violation of freedom" could explain the results that when both experimenters make the same measurement they get the same result with probability 1, but when they make different measurements they only get the same result 1/4 of the time. (I won't attempt to make an analogy for "violation of realism" because I don't really understand what that means, although some authors like this one seem to treat it as synonymous with violation of the experimenter's choice being statistically independent of hidden variables, which is just 'violation of freedom')


Violation of locality: Suppose that instead of a lotto card with preprinted hidden fruit under each square, the two experimenters instead receive touchscreen devices with three gray squares A, B, and C, and they can choose which square to tap, transforming that square into a picture of a fruit. If there is an FTL communication link between the two devices, and there is a brief interval between each experimenter tapping a square and the device displaying a fruit, then the computing elements inside the two devices can pool the information about what square each experimenter should see--if both experimenters tap the same square the devices can be programmed to show the same fruit, and if they tap different squares, the devices can be programmed to decide using a random or pseudorandom algorithm that gives a 1/4 chance of both displaying the same fruit and a 3/4 chance of displaying opposite fruits.


Violation of freedom: We could imagine that at the time the machine prints the two cards (or earlier), some entity sends a subliminal signal to each experimenter which predetermines what choice they will make about what square to scratch later, and also determines what fruits are printed under each square in a way that's correlated with the experimenter's choices. So on each trial where this entity predetermines the two experimenters to scratch the same square, it can also cause the card-printing machine to create a pair of cards with the same fruit under that square on each card; and on the trials where the entity predetermines that the experimenters scratch different squares, on 1/4 of those trials it can cause the machine to create pairs with the same fruit under the two squares that will be scratched, and on 3/4 it can cause the machine to create pairs with different fruits. Another subtle variation on this is the idea that the entity doesn't actually cause the experimenters to make particular choices but merely has a sort of "precognition" about what choices they will in fact make (implying some backwards-in-time causality), and determines what fruits will be under the two boxes that it knows will be scratched in the future using the same type of rule as above. The philosopher of science Huw Price discusses such an idea in his book Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point.



(As I mentioned in a comment above, advocates of the many-world interpretation also make the point that one can preserve locality if one drops the assumption that each measurement gives a single unique result, as elaborated in this paper by David Deutsch. If you want a simple conceptual toy model of how this could work, see this post I wrote up on physicsforums.com a while ago).


Thinking in these terms, your idea about the experimenter's "will" affecting the experiment could be imagined in terms of the scenario where each experimenter receives a touchscreen device which "decides" what fruit to reveal on-the-fly after the experimenter has tapped one of the three squares. We could imagine that the device has a built-in psychic receiver that's sensitive to the experimenter's will--consciously or unconsciously, the experimenter decides what fruit she wants to see when she hits a given square, and the device obliges by showing exactly that fruit. To make it more concrete we could also just drop the notion of psychic powers, and just imagine that each experimenter receives a touchscreen device in which they first tap a square, then there's a pop-up menu allowing them to decide what fruit will appear in that square's place. Without doing a detailed mathematical derivation in the style of Bell's, it's easy enough to play around with this and see that as long as each experimenter is choosing the square randomly and has no knowledge of what square the other experimenter chose, there is no classical way for them to both guarantee that they both get the same fruit whenever they tap the same square, and to guarantee that they only get the same fruit 1/4 of the time whenever they tap different squares. They could only do the first if they had agreed in advance something like "regardless of which square we choose, let's both make the result be a lemon on this trial", but that would mean that even if they pick different squares they would both get the same fruit. On the other hand, if they had made no agreement in advance about what fruit to "will" and couldn't communicate once they were moved to separate locations, then their ability to choose the fruit wouldn't help them to guarantee that they reveal the same fruit when they choose the same square.


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What is stagnation point in fluid mechanics. At the open end of the pitot tube the velocity of the fluid becomes zero.But that should result...